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7KH6PDUWSKRQHDVWKH³:HDSRQRIWKH
:HDN´$VVHVVLQJWKH5ROHRI
&RPPXQLFDWLRQ7HFKQRORJLHVLQ
0DOD\VLD¶V5HJLPH&KDQJH
5RVV7DSVHOO
Abstract: This paper examines the role of new communication technolo-
gies in the regime change of Malaysia’s 2018 elections. I argue that growing 
Internet penetration in semi-rural areas of Malaysia’s Peninsula “heart-
lands” allow for new forms of campaign message to be spread in unique 
and compelling ways. Facebook and instant-messenger platform 
WhatsApp are playing a prominent role in shaping political discourse in 
contemporary Malaysia, and this was evident in the election campaign that 
brought an end to Malaysia’s ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional’s, 60-
year hold on power. In this article I use James Scott’s (1987) Weapons of the 
Weak as the theoretical foundation for assessing the role of WhatsApp and 
other social media sites as tools of resistance, specifically in spreading in-
formation about the corruption and nepotism of Prime Minister Najib 
Razak and his wife, Rosmah Mansour. Given the prominence of the 
smartphone for news and information in Southeast Asia, this article ex-
plains how the digital era is changing the avenues via which the region 
receives and shares political information – as well as outlines the conse-
quences that it brings for elections campaigns and democracy. 
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,QWURGXFWLRQ
Since the emergence of the Internet in the late 1990s, urban Malaysians 
have been highly innovative in online campaigning. Strategies such as 
email lists, alternative news sites, blogging, and social media have all been 
used to criticise the ruling powers and to push for a change of government. 
As such, Malaysia has been a crucial site for examining the role of new 
media in election campaigning. Scholars examining Malaysia to understand 
the extent to which new communication technologies assist with demo-
cratic reform have largely ended up explaining their limitations, citing the 
fact that – despite the rise of online activism in the country – Malaysia’s 
ruling coalition was never able to be overthrown (Diamond 2010; Abbott 
2011; Weiss 2013; Pepinsky 2013; Tapsell 2013a). Malaysia’s stunning elec-
tion results of 2018 prompts those of us examining digital media and pol-
itics to ask, then: What kind of communications technologies were prom-
inent in the elections, and how were they used? Was there something hap-
pening in Malaysia’s 2018 new media activist space that did not exist pre-
viously, and, if so, what?  
This article argues that increased smartphone usage played an im-
portant role in political discourse in Malaysia’s 2018 elections. In particular, 
both Facebook and WhatsApp – accessed predominantly via smartphones 
– were central sites for alternative news and views. This has always been 
the case in Malaysia, but in 2018 geographical areas previously seen as 
government-voter strongholds were now able to access the Internet. To 
what extent this mattered is difficult to measure precisely, but the rise of 
smartphones is leading to a shift in Malaysia’s information society away 
from being passive consumers of mainstream media content and more 
towards being active participants in political discourse.  
Fieldwork for this article was conducted in Malaysia – in the lead-up 
to and the aftermath of GE14 – in February, April, and July of 2018. Re-
search included personal interviews with key political party social media 
strategists and professional online campaigners1 in the capital, Kuala Lum-
pur, and in the state of Kedah, in northern Peninsula Malaysia. Kedah was 
considered a “swing state” and crucial to determining the outcome of the 
elections. Fieldwork in Kedah researching semi-rural communities in-
cluded two weeks in April 2018 spent in Langkawi, Alor Setar, Guar 

1  Interviews were conducted in English or Bahasa Malay. Where interviews were 
conducted in Bahasa Malay, all translations to English for this article have been 
undertaken by the author himself. Two respondents within the government’s 
social media campaign team in Kuala Lumpur asked to speak on the condition 
of anonymity.  
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Chempedak, and Sedaka, which involved attending rallies, speaking with 
locals in these electorates, and meeting with campaign professionals and 
candidates. In addition to the fieldwork described above, I also asked cam-
paign professionals if I could join some of their WhatsApp groups created 
for election campaigning. Material obtained from WhatsApp that helped 
in forming the argument presented here is discussed in due course.  
By analysing recent data on Internet usage, interview material from 
campaigners, and some WhatsApp data, I shed light on the important role 
of new technologies in Malaysia’s contemporary information society. Of 
course, as existing scholarship on new media technologies has explained, 
there is nothing inherently subversive about the Internet, social media, or 
the smartphone (Diamond 2010; Hill and Sen 2000). In fact, recent de-
bates around “algorithmic enclaves” and “echo chambers” in Southeast 
Asia suggest that the smartphone and social media usage indeed have 
many negative effects on promoting identity politics (Grömping 2014; 
Lim 2017). But my argument here is that during Malaysia’s GE14, in-
creased smartphone usage allowed for greater subversion of authoritarian 
rule – and ultimately benefited the opposition, to help defeat a semi-au-
thoritarian regime.
0DOD\VLD¶V6KLIWLQJ,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\
Throughout this article I turn to the scholarship of anthropologist James 
Scott and his book Weapons of the Weak (1987), a pioneering text based on 
fieldwork he conducted in Kedah for a number of years during the 1980s. 
While much has changed in Malaysia’s information and communications 
technologies since Scott wrote Weapons of the Weak, in many ways the ave-
nues for power in Malaysia remains the same. Scott’s argument that Ma-
laysia’s “semi-competitive election system […] requires the political sup-
port of the bulk of the Malay electorate” (Scott 1987: 314) largely stands 
correct in 2018 as well. Also remaining valid is his argument on ethnic 
Malay rule that:
The main threat to the political hegemony of the ruling party has 
thus been concentrated largely in the poor, Malay, paddy-growing 
states of the north, where race is very much identified with eco-
nomic function. (Scott 1987: 44)  
In 2013 the government won the elections with 133 seats, but lost the 
popular vote. A total of 108 out of these 133 seats were considered “semi-
rural” or “rural” ones. The opposition comprehensively won big cities, 
especially in and around the capital, Kuala Lumpur. In response, Prime 
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Minister Najib controversially dismissed the result as a “Chinese tsunami” 
against the government; in reality, however, this was an “urban tsunami” 
in areas where Internet penetration was most prevalent, and where alter-
native news and views were able to be circulated more widely than in the 
information societies of rural areas. The Barisan Nasional (BN) had 
known about this dichotomy for some time. In 2004 then Prime Minister 
Abdullah Badawi famously said “we lost the internet war” of GE12 (Ma-
laysiakini 2008), while in 2013 Najib declared to urban campaigners that 
GE13 would be “the social media election” (Free Malaysia Today 2013). 
In the lead-up to GE14, the opposition was still expected to win large 
majorities of urban, non-Malay votes. The key, as opposition campaigners 
and strategists realised, was to win over the “Malay heartlands” predomi-
nantly on the Peninsula. In fact, their strategy was to win 100 out of 112 
seats in Peninsula Malaysia. The strategy was described by the opposition 
as the plan to cause a “Malay tsunami,” a retort to Najib’s aforementioned 
dismissive remark of 2013. The opposition initially held out little hope of 
winning many seats in Sabah and Sarawak – for a Malay tsunami to occur 
required constituencies of over 50 per cent ethnic Malay to abandon the 
BN, many for the first time in their lives, and switch their vote to the 
opposition instead. 
While the Malay heartlands are not monolithic, in the lead-up to 2018 
there were broad signs of a more fractious and disgruntled Malay elec-
torate by now existing. One big difference in these communities between 
2013 and 2018 was Internet access via the smartphone. Chinese-made An-
droid smartphones have made significant headway into the Malaysian mar-
ket (The Star 2017b), making the product a now more affordable purchase 
for middle- and lower-class Malaysians. In 2017 around 10 million 
smartphones were sold in Malaysia, with Samsung holding top market po-
sition; Chinese manufacturers Oppo, Vivo, and Huawei make a wider 
range of cheaper models, however (Nikkei Asia Review 2017). In 2017, 
MYR 7 billion in government subsidies was spent on the import of 
smartphones into Malaysia, as Prime Minister Najib felt the device was a 
“necessity” (Farhana Syed Nokman 2018). In 2012 the Malaysia Commu-
nications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) reported that while 77 
per cent of adults had access to the Internet only 24.2 per cent of rural 
voters did (MCMC 2012: 11). By 2017 the MCMC was reporting that ur-
ban areas maintained a similar percentage of Internet access, compared 
with a huge growth to 57 per cent in rural ones. In short, Internet access 
had doubled in the rural areas of Malaysia since the previous general elec-
tions.  
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By 2018 over 70 per cent of Malaysians had access to the Internet, 
and around 90 per cent of those individuals were using a smartphone 
(MCMC 2018). Of these smartphone users, 90 per cent of respondents 
said they used the device “to get information” – in other words, not only 
to call and message friends and family. It is the growth in Malay semi-rural 
and rural areas that matters here. Prior to the last elections in 2013, only 
around 58 per cent of Internet users were ethnic Malay. In two years, that 
number had grown to 68 per cent (MCMC 2018) – and continued to in-
crease going into election year too.  
This growth allowed for online information dissemination into areas 
where previously the newspaper and television station had dominated. 
Globally, where Internet penetration is rising, newspaper circulation 
drops; the nature of the newspaper, namely as pro-government pamphlet, 
has assisted in this rapid decline in Malaysia, however (see Gomez, Anuar, 
and Lee 2017). The New Straits Times’ daily circulation dropped from 
120,000 readers in 2008 to 44,000 in 2016 (Audit Bureau of Circulations 
2017). Media Prima, which owns the New Straits Times and is Malaysia’s 
biggest media conglomerate owned by the government, reported a loss in 
2017 of MYR 669 million (USD 172 million) (Zaharom 2018). Mainstream 
media, especially television, still plays an important role in Malaysia’s me-
dia landscape, especially among the Malay population (90 per cent of the 
government-run TV3 audience is Malay) (Audit Bureau of Circulations 
2017). But the expansion of smartphones, and increasingly 4G technology, 
cannot be ignored when assessing the contemporary media landscape in 
the country.  
What are Malaysians doing on their smartphones? Malaysia has an 
estimated 22 million Facebook users, out of a population of 32 million 
people (Chinnasamy 2018). In 2017 the Reuters Institute for the Study of 
Journalism at Oxford University reported Malaysia being “the global 
leader for WhatsApp news usage,” where just over half of news consumers 
surveyed in that country use the platform to “find, share or discuss news 
in a given week” (The Star 2017a). Their 2018 report asked Malaysians 
where they receive their news. Seventy-two per cent of Malaysians an-
swered social media, 57 per cent television, 26 per cent radio, and 41 per 
cent print media. In “devices for news,” 77 per cent answered “the 
smartphone” (Reuters Institute 2018: 132). Breaking down these statistics, 
64 per cent of Malaysians said they gathered their news from Facebook 
and 54 per cent from WhatsApp – numbers far higher than for any other 
social media or instant-messenger platform (the next highest was Insta-
gram at 33 per cent, with Twitter well below at 25 per cent). The report 
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showed that globally, news consumption was shifting even more towards 
WhatsApp (Agence France Press 2018).  
Younger voters are important here. Around 47 per cent of Internet 
users in Malaysia are aged between 20 and 29, and another 25 per cent 
between 30 and 39; younger voters using smartphones were thus central 
to any election campaign (MCMC 2018). There was also a general belief 
among all campaigners – although it must be said this is unproven in the 
literature or research to date – that younger generations of voters in Ma-
laysia returning home to the provinces had a significant ability to influence 
their parents’ votes. One Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) government cam-
paigner in Kedah said:
We have problems understanding the decision of first-time voters, 
and this is because they all have smartphones. We can’t rely on them 
to vote the way their parents voted or other family members vote 
because they are more individuals in terms of the information they 
receive through these devices. (Sanusi Latas, personal interview, 
Alor Setar, 8 April 2018) 
As one villager in Kedah told me: 
Things are changing. My grandfather voted for PAS his whole life. 
My father voted for UMNO [United Malays National Organisation] 
his whole life. But me? I will choose the best candidate. (personal 
interview, Sedaka, 6 April 2018) 
But who would voters see as the “best” candidate? Even in the days prior 
to the election, it was not clear who was likely to win. 
To conclude, in Malaysia the opposition has long managed to utilise 
new media platforms to advocate for their cause. Their campaigning ena-
bled them to win over voters with Internet access in urban areas, but prior 
to 2018 had little effect in winning over Malay heartland voters with lim-
ited or no Internet access. Alternative news and views distributed online 
(including at the most basic level, the speeches or comments of leading 
opposition figures) in these areas were less prominent than in urban areas 
with internet access. By 2018 the smartphone, and consequently Facebook 
and WhatsApp, were more widely used by ethnic Malay voters in non-
urban areas. But smartphone usage and social media are not inherently 
pro-opposition spaces. Was the opposition campaigning more effective 
online, then? To answer this question, I use interviews with key campaign 
officials in the social media space in the lead-up to GE14.
  The Smartphone as the “Weapon of the Weak” 15 

:KDWV$SSDQG)DFHERRN&DPSDLJQLQJLQ
*(
All political parties were well prepared for online campaigning during 
GE14. A feature of the 2013 elections was the Democratic Action Party’s 
(DAP) online campaigning, dubbed by some as the “Red Bean Army”; in 
reality, though, their campaigners were far less organised than the name 
implies (Tapsell 2013b). In 2018 DAP did not have virulent supporters 
online, in part because ethnic Chinese support was less fervent once Ma-
hathir was named opposition leader. Bee Yin was in charge of DAP’s so-
cial media strategies in 2018. She confirmed that the DAP acquired phone 
numbers, and Facebook IDs linked to phone numbers, in order to send 
out messages throughout the course of the campaign. Fahmi Fadzil was 
the People’s Justice Party’s (PKR) social media strategist in 2013. In 2018 
he ran as a member of parliament in Lembah Panti, but was still involved 
in social media strategies within the party. He had the following to say:
Campaigning on WhatsApp is like white-water rafting, riding a rag-
ing torrent. You have neighbourhood groups, work groups, alumni 
groups, political interest groups. We need to try to make sure that 
we have someone in each of these groups. We can’t create the 
groups. We instruct all of our members to make sure that they have 
state parliamentary level down to polling district level – various 
WhatsApp groups, in order to send information down. It’s about 
either inserting yourself into your neighbourhood group [or] your 
club group. (Fahmi Fadzil, personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 5 
February 2018) 
As in previous campaigns, the opposition was well aware of the impact 
that social media campaigning would have on the election.  
But by GE14 the government was also far more involved in online 
campaigning. In 2013, Tun Faisal was central to forming the UMNO 
Cybertroopers Club. In the lead-up to the election campaign, he remarked 
that: 
We are doing better than in 2013. Our machinery was out of touch 
from the social media carriers at that time. The government and 
party machinery were too dependent on the traditional media. They 
had not updated themselves on new media. We learnt from the mis-
take of the previous election. (Tun Faisal, personal interview, Kuala 
Lumpur, 6 February 2018) 
But he noted WhatsApp was central for campaigning in 2018, which 
meant “the terrain is just so different.” He said that in the lead-up to the 
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campaign the government created “infrastructure and links” through the 
UMNO IT Bureau led by Amat Maslan, which then filters down through 
WhatsApp groups into the state and division levels of UMNO, dissemi-
nating information to their circles. This then then filters down to branch 
and ultimately village level, to village heads and imams – then getting 
passed to the grassroots communities.  
We coordinate our messaging through these online platforms. Pre-
viously we relied on blogs and Facebook, now the communication 
infrastructure of WhatsApp is core business. (Tun Faisal, personal 
interview, Kuala Lumpur, 6 February 2018) 
Fahmi Fadzil agreed that the BN was doing more in the social media space 
than they had in 2013: 
The government initially thought WhatsApp was a threat to them. 
Initially the government would say “don’t believe everything you 
say on WhatsApp.” In response to the mass proliferation of infor-
mation they have now embraced it. (personal interview, Kuala 
Lumpur, 5 February 2018)
Even the PAS, which dominates in rural areas of Malaysia, saw it as crucial 
to be more involved in spreading information online during GE14. PAS’s 
vice president, Iskandar Abdul Samad, commented that he had conducted 
a study of his constituency through the Institute Darul Islam and found 
that 80 per cent of voters are connected to some form of social media: 
Even if you go to the most rural constituencies, some people have 
got some access to Internet and social media. Some people have 
two handphones. You are connectable everywhere. It’s not only the 
young, but [also] the middle-aged. Even older people are into social 
media. (Iskandar, personal interview, Shah Alam, 7 February 2018)
Iskandar developed a system whereby he can send thousands of messages 
to voters through WhatsApp, because if an issue is going to be created “it 
won’t be on television, it will be on social media.” He claimed that many 
people “don’t want to keep up with all the latest developments [of GE14], 
they just see what’s on Facebook and WhatsApp” (Iskandar, personal in-
terview, Shah Alam, 7 February 2018). 
Of course, smartphones were not the only “battlefield” for winning 
over voters in GE14. As Scott explained, UMNO’s system relied on a 
“well-organised and well-financed political machine providing individual 
and collective blandishments that reach into every Malay village” (Scott 
1987: 57). This itself is dependent on “various forms of patronage, and its 
privileged access to the institutions that distribute that patronage” (Scott 
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1987: 136). Further research from anthropologists and political scientists 
could uncover how these systems of patronage and a well-organised ma-
chine fractured and even crumbled as Mahathir formed a rival ethnic Ma-
lay party. Nevertheless, in my interviews with campaign officials in Kedah 
in the lead-up to the elections a prominent concern was their increased 
inability to manage and manipulate the channels of information flowing 
into semi-rural Malay areas. 
Knowing the power of these platforms after the election results of 
2008 and of 2013, all political parties introduced initiatives to pump out 
their own information on these sites and to criticise the opposition online. 
The question remains, then, as to why was the opposition successful in 
winning this election, rather than the government? Speaking after the elec-
tion campaign, Tai Zee Kin – who was part of Prime Minister Najib’s 
social media campaign team throughout GE14 – observed that “the op-
position was more sophisticated and eloquent in making content go viral 
on WhatsApp,” while the BN campaigners were, in his opinion, focused 
on pumping out content online in similar ways to traditional media that 
was “inorganic” and “official.” He explained further that the opposition 
did a better job of posting photos and video clips with short headlines 
inciting and enraging viewers, such as “Can you condone this stupid be-
haviour by a minister?” He added: 
People share content on WhatsApp when they feel excited, angry, 
funny, or they have sympathy. Emotional attributions are important. 
That’s what creating WhatsApp content is all about. (Zee Kin, per-
sonal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 15 July 2018)
Thus, winning the “social media war” is not simply a matter of the amount 
of official campaign material being disseminated by political parties and 
their social media professionals, but also of producing the type of content 
that makes citizens share with their friends and family “organically.” To 
delve more deeply into this issue we need to identify what kinds of infor-
mation are spread via WhatsApp and Facebook, and the type of digital 
public sphere that is now emerging via smartphone technologies.
7KH6PDUWSKRQHDVD³:HDSRQRIWKH:HDN´
In this section I try to better understand GE14’s digital public sphere, 
which as I have argued above is largely driven by smartphone usage. I posit 
that the smartphone was used as a “weapon of the weak” in order to ques-
tion the legitimacy of Prime Minister Najib and to subvert the dominant 
messages of the BN campaign. This conclusion comes from interviews 
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with campaign professionals, fieldwork in Kedah, and from being “em-
bedded” in numerous WhatsApp groups during GE14. The WhatsApp 
groups that I was a part of during Malaysia’s GE14 campaign were anon-
ymous in that, unless they declared it in the group, people’s origins, age, 
gender, and professional background were not clear.2 Thus, this research 
is not representative of Malaysia’s national WhatsApp or social media dis-
course. For a start, the conversations were only in English or Bahasa Malay, 
and never in Chinese or Tamil. Second, to join the group respondents had 
to be quite interested in discussing politics, as over 1,000 messages would 
be sent in a single day (although it was clear not everyone was engaging 
regularly in the discussions, so people “switched on and off” throughout 
the day or week).  
The material presented here is, then, simply one sample of how 
WhatsApp discourse played out during GE14. In many ways this was dif-
ferent to a lot of WhatsApp communications, which were more private 
conversations between family members and friends. Yet the material being 
shared on these sites, and the discussions that ensued, give us some sense 
of how this new digital public sphere operates. There is surprisingly little 
research on instant-messenger chat groups and politics, and this article is 
an attempt to fill this gap in some small way.  
The discussions on these groups largely remained national; respond-
ents only rarely talked about local politics. Occasionally respondents iden-
tified themselves as being from certain regions of Malaysia to provide a 
local context to a national issue, but it was rare that groups discussed local 
political candidates or local party policies in any depth. Further research 
could examine more localised WhatsApp groups. Joining simply meant 
being added by the administrator, in most cases being put in touch directly 
through a political campaigner who was already part of the group; in some 
cases, a group invitation was sent out on one WhatsApp group for anyone 
to join a different one. The maximum number of people WhatsApp allows 
in a group is 256, and the ones used for this article typically consisted of 
this maximum number of individuals. Material from the campaign period, 
running from 19 April until election day on 16 May, was exported from 
WhatsApp into a Word document, and analysed individually by the author. 
These exported documents typically contained between 200,000 and 
250,000 words. 
Facebook pages on GE14 were collated by the author from conver-
sations on WhatsApp, whereby a link was usually provided by someone in 

2  Authors of comments on threads simply came up in my phone as random Ma-
laysian numbers.  
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one of the large groups. Around 50 per cent of Facebook pages posted on 
WhatsApp were videos, often of political leaders giving speeches or rallies, 
or short campaign advertisements. The rest of the material was usually an 
article that someone had read online, or a post that was public and was 
being spread around on WhatsApp. As such, I argue that while Facebook 
was central for the creation and distribution of material for GE14, as we 
shall see in the material below, WhatsApp provided important insights 
into how people responded to material – meaning, what they thought 
about issues being discussed in GE14. 
*RVVLS
In his seminal work Weapons of the Weak, political anthropologist James 
Scott wrote extensively about the role of rumour and gossip in semi-au-
thoritarian Malaysia as “symbolic resistance” and “a kind of democratic 
‘voice’ in conditions where power and possible repression make open acts 
of disrespect dangerous” (Scott 1987: 282). “Gossip is never disinterested,” 
he wrote, “it is a partisan effort (by class, faction, family) to advance its 
claims and interests against those of others” (Scott 1987: 282). Gossip is a 
central part of subversive communication under Malaysia’s BN regime. As 
Scott writes:  
For the poor […] gossip achieves the expression of opinion, of con-
tempt, of disapproval while minimizing the risks of identification 
and reprisal. Malicious gossip symbolically chips away at the repu-
tations of the rich […] in the same fashion that anonymous thefts 
in the night materially chip away at the property of the rich, and is 
one of the few means available to a subordinate class to clothe the 
practice of resistance with the safe disguise of outward compliance. 
(Scott 1987: 282) 
Gossip, rumour, and conspiracy played a central part in Malaysia’s GE14, 
not only in-person but also online – more specifically, on Facebook and 
WhatsApp.  
The main “gossip” in the context of GE14 was Najib and his wife’s 
personal wealth, linked to 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) cor-
ruption scandals. As one government social media campaigner, who spoke 
on the condition of anonymity, told me:  
Rosmah is always in the top-ten talked-about issues online. We have 
had to give up stopping negative content. If we put out alternative 
content, it just leads to more negative comments, so we stopped 
trying. (personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 3 February 2018)  
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Discussion of first lady Rosmah was central to the dissent against Najib’s 
government. It was related to wealth, status, and entitlement, but the gen-
dered nature of the discourse whereby the woman is responsible for the 
exorbitant spending cannot be ignored. The goods and services tax (GST) 
“goes to Rosmah” so she can buy clothes, jewellery, and travel was a con-
stant quip made in WhatsApp conversations. Comments like “I won’t be 
pinched with the rising cost of living to save Rosmah” were common. 
Another one that “freedom fighters did not fight for independence so 
Rosmah can buy expensive bags” also exemplifies the discussion of the 
first lady on WhatsApp. Rosmah was said to have had an office in the 
prime minister’s building, from where she rather than Najib made most of 
the decisions. Serious discussions revolved around Rosmah’s purchasing 
of expensive cincin (rings), claims that were occasionally refuted by BN 
supporters who sent links from mainstream media reporting that Rosmah 
never purchased any such items. She was said by some in the group to 
have “anything she wants.” Others satirically wrote “a vote for Najib is a 
vote for Rosmah,” and often the most unpopular decisions were attributed 
to her by people within the groups. The discourse whereby Rosmah was 
front and centre of a corruption scandal relates strongly to the way in 
which other controversial Southeast Asian first ladies were derided by the 
populace, such as Imelda Marcos of the Philippines (famous for owning 
thousands of pairs of shoes) and Madame Tien Suharto (colloquially 
known by Indonesians as Madame “Ten Percent,” for the taxes that alleg-
edly went straight to her bank account).  
Much of this gossip was unsubstantiated by Facebook pages or news 
articles. Rosmah was “never in a ceramah [public discussion],” which led to 
more speculation of where she actually was – such as being “seen leaving 
the country with bags of $$$$.” Regular quips revolved around Rosmah’s 
hair, for example. Other comments such as this were made:  
Is Najib really under Rosmah’s thumb? Coz I’d believe Rosmah got 
it bad during from Najib after the stunt she pulled sitting between 
the married couple during Datuk Lee’s wedding. After that I seem 
to notice a great reduction in her appearance publicly.3  
While debates and counterarguments were common in these groups, only 
a few pro-BN supporters bothered to come to Rosmah’s defence. One 
wrote “I’d like to arrange a meeting so you can see what she is really like,” 
and occasionally anti-Rosmah chat was responded to by others as “juve-
nile.” Overall, gossip about Rosmah was central to discussion on 

3  For the sake of anonymity, all such quotations from WhatsApp group chats are 
not specifically referenced.  
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WhatsApp – far more so than for other political or campaign figures, and 
it was almost always negative in nature. 
Conversations about Rosmah exemplified the subversive nature of 
WhatsApp communication via the smartphone. These were not discus-
sions that were spurred on by mainstream media coverage or by explicit 
political campaign messages from the opposition. Rather, this was “mali-
cious gossip symbolically to chip away at the rich,” as Scott (1987: 282) 
writes. This is not to say there is no evidence for Rosmah’s wealth and 
corruption – in the aftermath of the elections, police raided the apartment 
of Najib and Rosmah and, indeed, found thousands of handbags – but at 
the time of the election campaign the discussions were based largely on 
gossip (some of which turned out to be true) and slander. The content 
may have been justifiable, but the way that it was spread shows how gossip 
via the smartphone can be a weapon of the weak. 
&RQVSLUDF\
When Kedahans I spoke with discussed the general election, invariably 
they began to talk about Najib and the 1MDB wealth fund controversy. 
When I subsequently asked where they got their information from (given 
Malaysia’s mainstream media mostly avoids reporting this issue), they 
would almost always say Facebook or WhatsApp. Details of Najib’s 
1MDB corruption scandal, repressed, as noted, in the mainstream media, 
spread frequently on social media and messenger applications. While there 
was a general belief in Malaysia that the details of 1MDB were too com-
plex to resonate in rural towns and villages, the message of government 
corruption was clearly spread far and wide.  
The Malaysian government consistently tried to produce differing 
forms of information on the 1MDB issue. They created documents that 
said the money was a donation from the Saudis, that 1MDB was actually 
not in debt, that the story was “fake news.” One BN campaigner told me:  
1MDB is hard to stop. All we can do is put out material saying what 
the Saudis said, denying it, and making enough doubt in the voter 
minds that this is all “political” rather than factual. (personal inter-
view, 2 February 2018)  
For example, 1MDB president Arul Kanda Kandasamy (appointed in 
2015) would embark on a nationwide roadshow to explain the 1MDB is-
sue ahead of the polls earlier this year. He reportedly told attendees that 
the investment fund was a “business issue,” and urged politicians not to 
“politicise” issues related to 1MDB ahead of the general election (Utusan 
Malaysia 2018).  
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There was significant and fervent political debate around 1MDB in 
the WhatsApp groups that I had access to. At one point in one group, 
someone asked for “ground rules for no more 1MDB discussions.” The 
basic discussions on all groups were based around pro-BN supporters 
claiming there was no evidence to accuse Najib of personally stealing 
funds, while pro-opposition supporters accused him and the government 
of covering up this financial crime. The image of Najib as a “thief” became 
prominent during the campaign. Numerous cartoons, memes, and images 
were shared of him with a thief mask, sack of money over his shoulder, or 
with cash in his pocket stealing from the populace. Stories relating to 
1MDB were shared regularly on Facebook and WhatsApp. From the com-
ments, respondents either used these stories as evidence that the Malaysian 
government was covering up crime (with explicit support from the gov-
ernment-owned Malaysian mainstream media) or, alternatively, the media 
was “biased” and was using 1MDB to attack the Malaysian government – 
whom their own countries did not like.  
Were citizens likely to believe that Najib was implicated in 1MDB, 
despite him denying any wrongdoing? Regardless of many believing the 
issue was indeed politicised, numerous Malaysians linked the 1MDB issue 
to how they themselves felt about the country. Many reflected on how 
times seemed to be better for Malaysia under previous governments (in-
cluding Mahathir), and in their minds – given that the economy was in a 
more difficult position now – this was perhaps due to the misspending of 
government funds. For example, one person on WhatsApp wrote: 
TunM [Mahathir] got Klia [KL International airport) got klcc [kuala 
lumpur convention centre which includes the twin towers] [...] 
1mdb [...] wang sudah keluar [...] Mana bangunan nyaa? [1MDG […] 
the money is gone […] where is the development?] 
Another citizen expressed a useful discussion of 1MDB as being linked to 
the current state of the Malaysian economy in his or her mind:  
[…] honestly speaking 1MDB issue or whatever rasuah cincin issue 
I dun really care if as long as I live in a country which I can live 
comfortably financially or environmentally in my country , but now 
look at norm , middle income group are slowly disappearing and 
low income not need to said d they r worse in the situation, well ,sal-
ary still the same why am the norm suffering there is because poor 
management economy of this country, norm are whole life in debt , 
and always in news social media show that rasuah cincin 1MDB 
issue , as a norm will you be piss? Will you [name removed]? Some 
more is tax payer money.  
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When discussion was raised about Najib’s policy of doing business deals 
with China, many defended him for improving Malaysia’s economy. But 
the Chinese connections were again related to 1MDB, and how he needed 
to sell off Malaysian assets to pay debts. As one citizen in a pro-BN group 
wrote regarding the business deals with China:  
[I]f no scandal then ok la [...] now got donor 2.6b scandle [sic] 1mdb 
[...] got luxury watches [...] no income tax prove [sic] [...] sure ppl in 
the street dont [sic] accept.  
Anthropologists elsewhere in Southeast Asia have written about how “ru-
mor is subversive […] not when its content is directed against the govern-
ment, but when the source is believed not to be the government” (Sigel 
1994: 63, italics in the original). Under a regime that shackles and restricts 
the mainstream media, the practice of passing on information, rumour, 
and gossip becomes a heightened aspect of being an informed citizen – in 
order to understand the real story. A non-government source, particularly 
if it is someone that you trust, hence becomes more believable. 
Denials from government officials and counter-narratives from gov-
ernment-owned mainstream media often have the reverse effect: they con-
firm to the populace that there is something suspicious going on. For ex-
ample, when Utusan Malaysia (2011) published a front page story saying 
Rosmah used her own money to purchase an expensive ring, having saved 
up for it since she was a child, it simply solidified the idea to many Malay-
sians that she had in fact purchased it using state funds. This Utusan story 
circulated widely on Facebook throughout GE14, but often as a joke or 
meme at Rosmah’s expense. 
1DMLE¶V5HVSRQVH7KH³$QWL)DNH1HZV%LOO´
In response to the wide array of alternative news and views being shared 
on Facebook and WhatsApp in the lead-up to the campaign period, the 
Najib government hastily drafted and passed the so-called Anti-Fake 
News Bill. It vaguely defined the phenomenon as “news, information, data 
and reports which are wholly or partly false,” carrying a fine of more than 
USD 100,000 and up to six years in jail. It covered reports published in 
Malaysia or by foreign nationals overseas, as long as they related to news 
about Malaysia or a Malaysian citizen. Understandably, civil society groups 
complained that this was a crackdown on Malaysian netizens criticising 
the government – in particular on those spreading information about 
1MDB (see Quartz 2018).  
The anti-fake news law had a significant impact on the political dis-
course in the WhatsApp groups that I was embedded in. People regularly 
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accused others of spreading fake news, and demanded that they retract 
statements. They warned others that they could go to jail for spreading 
fake news. If they did not agree with an event or detail that someone else 
wrote, they often replied with the comment “fake news.” Many citizens 
supported the idea that the government would crack down on those who 
were doing what they saw as spreading fake news. They saw offering what 
did not align with their own opinion (whether pro-BN or pro-opposition) 
as being largely spreading fake news.  
This partisanship around the flow of information leads to a more po-
larised political discourse on chat groups, and the concerning trend that 
citizens threatened to (and perhaps did) report each other to the police if 
they shared material on a WhatsApp one. In one group, a citizen wrote: 
“I am going to the police station to report a few today. The fake news in 
this group also I will report together.” This was met with shock but also 
agreement from those who supported the person’s political views. In 
many ways, the government’s objective in creating the bill – to stifle dis-
sent – had a direct impact in that it provided a means by which citizens 
online could threaten each other; if implemented earlier, with more signif-
icant cases of individuals being arrested (perhaps for criticising the gov-
ernment or the prime minister), it would have had a seriously chilling ef-
fect on online discourse. 
However, there was also much to admire in the way that citizens sub-
verted the Anti-Fake News Bill in messenger groups. If we take the above 
argument that the sharing of rumour, gossip, and conspiracy is a subver-
sive tactic to reduce the legitimacy of the ruling government, and the sub-
sequent Anti-Fake New Bill a response to negate some of this content 
online, then citizens who got around the chilling effect of the bill were 
also advancing the subversion. For example one citizen posted a story 
about “rumours surrounding the attorney-general,” writing: “Sharing here 
solely as fiction, I am not spreading fake news. I don’t believe in it, but 
read it and see the cerita [story] dongeng […].” Others described 
WhatsApp as a place to “verify” other news circulating on Facebook and 
on the Internet. They often posted with “pls [please] verify fake or not” 
before sharing details, or “they say fake news but sharing here for infor-
mation.” There were many such stories circulated which were anti-gov-
ernment, complete with additional comments such as: “true or not?”; 
“sharing only fyi [for your information] not sure if true”; and much more. 
The compound effect of sending such messages on WhatsApp was to en-
courage others to also share memes and stories on the platform as well. 
Why does this matter? This discourse shows that many citizens con-
tinued to share anti-government information even in larger groups where 
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they did not know everyone, and even in ones where people threatened to 
report them for fake news – but they did so through what Scott terms 
“feigned ignorance,” another weapon of the weak. The rumours, conspir-
acies, gossip, and slander continued, and were a central part of election 
discourse on instant-messenger groups. Thus, my argument here is that 
the subversive tactics used on WhatsApp were a digitised weapon of the 
weak. In defining the “ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups,” 
Scott writes of “foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, 
feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth” (1987: 29). In 
the digital era, weapons of the weak in Malaysia included gossip, rumour, 
conspiracy, feigning ignorance, generating uncertainty, casting doubt, and 
subverting state authorities – all predominantly done digitally, through 
smartphones, social media platforms, and chat applications.  
&RQFOXVLRQ7KH6PDUWSKRQHDQG'HPRFUDF\
What does Malaysia’s regime change tell us about the role of technology 
in bringing down semi-authoritarian regimes? First, Larry Diamond was 
right when – in analysing the role of “liberation technologies in Malaysia” 
– he wrote: “If a transition occurs, it will be mainly due to political factors 
– the coalescence of an effective opposition and the blunders of an arro-
gant regime” (2010: 73). Certainly, these two factors came together in 2018. 
Yet this arguably also occurred in 2013 too; in any case, despite these ob-
vious factors in the lead-up to the 2018 election, the leading political sci-
entists of Malaysia did not predict this outcome. Further debate within this 
space remains the realm of political scientists studying political party coa-
litions and regime change, and so is beyond the scope of this article. To 
be sure, the opposition successfully connected 1MDB and government 
corruption to broader issues of the rising cost of living and of taxes (in 
particular GST) – and thus a ruling government that was in power for 60 
years was finally, and comprehensively, voted out. But in the “race be-
tween democrats seeking to circumvent internet censorship and dictator-
ships that want to extend and refine it” (Diamond 2010: 81), did the dem-
ocrats win this round in Malaysia?  
This research has argued that the smartphone was used extensively 
to circumvent mainstream media discourse, and as a subversive device for 
circulating anti-government messages. In 2018, geographical areas in Pen-
insula Malaysia such as Kuala Lumpur, Johor, Ipoh, Malacca, and Seber-
ang Perai were now able to host 4G technology – meaning faster down-
load speeds and ultimately increased usage of the Internet via smartphones 
by voters in those areas (see Open Signal 2018). For all their (serious) flaws 
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around data privacy and the spread of disinformation, Facebook and 
WhatsApp were common ways that citizens in the rural and semi-rural 
heartlands of Malaysia received alternative news and views on their 
smartphones in Malaysia. Facebook was the central place to see images of 
Mahathir at rallies and watching his speeches live, but also for Malaysians 
to regularly read fervent criticism of Prime Minister Najib and the Barisan 
Nasional. Thus the smartphone, and with it Facebook and WhatsApp, was 
a space for alternative information, but crucially also for gossip, slander, 
jokes, and disagreements – and, in Scott’s theory, for “words, feints and 
counterfeints, threats, a skirmish or two, and, above all, propaganda” 
(1987: 3). All of this is part of a more subversive public sphere brought 
about by digitalisation and personal handsets. These are all part of Scott’s 
weapons of the weak, which “require little or no coordination or planning” 
(Scott 1987: 184) – but rather simple activity via messages and social media. 
When “liberation technology” scholars write about regime change, 
their arguments are often framed in terms of “social media revolutions” – 
whereby alternative sources of news create spontaneous street protests, 
resulting in a spectacular crumbling of a regime overthrown by a fervent 
democratic revolt. This is fuelled by what Castells (2009) calls “networks 
of outrage and hope,” in this instance digital ones. Malaysia’s use of liber-
ation technology to bring about regime change is far more timid and hid-
den, but no less subversive. Rather than through a spontaneous online 
movement to bring down the government, Malaysia’s regime was defeated 
peacefully through the ballot box after numerous previously close at-
tempts – specifically as a result of the online “tenacity of self-preservation 
in ridicule, in truculence, in irony, in petty acts of noncompliance” (Scott 
1987: 350). 
Of course former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, aged 92 at the 
time of his election victory, strikes a peculiar figure as Malaysia’s champion 
of democracy, and thus call into the question whether Malaysia’s voters 
were on Facebook and WhatsApp as tools of democracy or because they 
believed that they were voting for a similar regime but with a different 
leader – and one who has been part of that regime previously. The answer 
would depend on the individual voter, and subsequent research and trends 
in Malaysian politics will shed further light on this issue. In the northern 
Malaysian semi-rural and rural areas that I visited, few spoke of voting for 
the opposition in order to advance democracy.  
This is where Scott’s research has more meaning than that of those 
of us who have written about the previous limitations of new technologies 
in bringing about democratic reform. Scott argues that we should not as-
sume that subversive discourse is always “principled” or “selfless,” and 
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indeed GE14 should not necessarily be seen as a victory for a visionary 
pro-democracy movement. The nationwide vote to oust the Najib Razak-
led BN was also one of material needs seen broadly as to do with the rising 
cost of living, and bread-and-butter issues such as the struggle over the 
appropriation of work, production, property, and taxes; in GE14’s case, 
the explicit policy platform of the opposition to abolish the GST. But, as 
Scott writes, these are “the essence of lower-class politics and resistance” 
(1987: 296). 
Scott shone light on and celebrated “the steady, grinding efforts to 
hold one’s own against overwhelming odds, a spirit and practice that pre-
vents the worst and promises something better” (Scott 1987: 350), but also 
argued that these weapons of the weak were largely what occurred “be-
tween revolts.” Here I have argued these weapons of the weak were, in 
fact, part of the revolt in Malaysia’s GE14. Nevertheless, there is nothing 
inherently “democratic” about some of these forces and techniques. While 
Facebook and WhatsApp triumphantly undermined the government-con-
trolled mainstream media in semi-authoritarian Malaysia, at the same time 
these platforms are also complicit in the declining popular trust in profes-
sional journalism in democratic countries like the Philippines and Indone-
sia, for example. As mainstream media loses credibility, Facebook and 
WhatsApp content is becoming ever-more successful in shaping political 
discourse. The digital era is changing the avenues through which we re-
ceive information. Given the prominence of the smartphone for news and 
information in Southeast Asia, we should look to this region to see what 
these new “communities” look like – and how society is now changing. 
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